Jump to content
DOSBODS
  • Welcome to DOSBODS

     

    DOSBODS is free of any advertising.

    Ads are annoying, and - increasingly - advertising companies limit free speech online. DOSBODS Forums are completely free to use. Please create a free account to be able to access all the features of the DOSBODS community. It only takes 20 seconds!

     

Recommended Posts

eek
1 hour ago, spygirl said:

Apollo’s Greensill bid close to collapse

US private equity firm halts talks to buy parts of stricken finance company

https://www.ft.com/content/ddb46251-eb70-407d-806e-e2f500e2957f

Negotiating strategy. Or Greenswill is a pile of junk.

its a pile of junk.

You don't walk away if there it is vaguely worth getting a deal as it allows someone else to get through the door. 

  • Agree 2
Link to post
Share on other sites
  • Replies 83
  • Created
  • Last Reply

Top Posters In This Topic

  • spygirl

    44

  • sancho panza

    9

  • wherebee

    8

  • eek

    6

Top Posters In This Topic

Popular Posts

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-03/greensill-s-overnight-fall-from-grace-was-months-in-the-making Greensill’s Overnight Downfall Was Many Months in Making From the outside, 2

Thinks its got no net exposure.. Until a few months ago, Greenswill would have appeared to be nothing more than obscure corporate cheque cashing service. AS it implodes, it become obvious th

A rule of thumb for me is that any C-suite talking about AI and machine learning as their market advantage should be run away from very very very fast. I first encountered this 30 years ago, when

Posted Images

wherebee
1 hour ago, spygirl said:

A failure by Apollo to strike a deal would highlight Greensill’s heavy reliance on other companies’ technology platforms, even though founder Lex Greensill frequently touted his company’s prowess in “artificial intelligence” and “machine learning”.

A rule of thumb for me is that any C-suite talking about AI and machine learning as their market advantage should be run away from very very very fast.

I first encountered this 30 years ago, when a non-UK government department was singing their learning AI in a presentation.  I was the awkward cunt who kept asking questions around what exactly that meant.  In the end they had to admit it was just humans putting thresholds in and then moving the levels up and down depending on other metrics.  fucking clown world.

So excepting some cutting edge stuff by the Israelis, Google, or spooks, AI and machine learning is, basically, bollocks in my view.

  • Agree 3
  • Informative 1
Link to post
Share on other sites
spygirl

Tokio Marine questions validity of Greensill insurance policies

Exclusive: insurer threatens litigation as fight heats up over who will pay for collapse

https://www.ft.com/content/18c1892b-1ad3-4ed5-8c8f-075522275490

 

Apollo’s Greensill bid crumbles as Credit Suisse puts staff on leave

US private equity group halts talks to buy parts of stricken finance company

https://www.ft.com/content/ddb46251-eb70-407d-806e-e2f500e2957f

 

Reminds of this clown,

https://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/oct/24/economics-creditcrunch-federal-reserve-greenspan#:~:text="I made a mistake in,the firms%2C" said Greenspan.

"I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interests of organisations, specifically banks and others, were such that they were best capable of protecting their own shareholders and their equity in the firms," said Greenspan.

Link to post
Share on other sites
reformed nice guy
3 hours ago, wherebee said:

A rule of thumb for me is that any C-suite talking about AI and machine learning as their market advantage should be run away from very very very fast

Add in blockchain too!

  • Agree 1
Link to post
Share on other sites
eek
1 hour ago, reformed nice guy said:

Add in blockchain too!

I'm still trying to find a purpose for blockchain that couldn't be done better by a trusted first or third party owning and managing a database

For AI I'm starting to see narrow benefits but mainly in photo processing and other niche industries where you are looking for particular items in a photo and have some control over the photos you are receiving otherwise you have issues like the ones highlighted in 'Typographic attack': pen and paper fool AI into thinking apple is an iPod | Artificial intelligence (AI) | The Guardian (yes it's the guardian it was the first link I found)

 

Edited by eek
Link to post
Share on other sites
spygirl

There was a great comment on one of the FT articles - 

A fintech with no finance or no technology.

Link to post
Share on other sites
Democorruptcy

ECB imposed negative interest rates were part of the problem

Quote

 

German towns braced for €500m in losses from Greensill Bank collapse

The looming collapse of Greensill Bank has sent shockwaves through German municipalities, which held up to €500m with the lender that was not subject to ECB-imposed negative interest rates — but also not covered by deposit insurance.

https://www-ft-com.btpl.idm.oclc.org/content/015fd183-42d5-4fdb-8f8e-d63187a3f67b

 

 

  • Informative 1
Link to post
Share on other sites
eek
1 hour ago, Democorruptcy said:

ECB imposed negative interest rates were part of the problem

 

Not part of the original problem - that money could have been what kept the scam going another x months. 

But it's made it $500m bigger and it's going to cause the German Government a problem that they will need to fix somehow or other. 

Edited by eek
Link to post
Share on other sites
spygirl

UK taxpayer exposed to Gupta and Greensill via £1bn debt guarantees

Backing for coronavirus schemes, and a Scottish power project, has officials scurrying to clarify public liability

https://www.ft.com/content/8baceeda-957a-409d-8061-17b70f298fe1



Using a state-backed coronavirus lending scheme, Greensill advanced hundreds of millions of pounds to companies linked to Gupta, according to people familiar with the matter, a much higher amount than previously known.

...

In a second scheme, the Scottish government also provided guarantees worth about £575m to GFG when it bought an aluminium smelter in Lochaber and two nearby hydropower plants.

  • Informative 2
  • Lol 1
Link to post
Share on other sites
spygirl

Sort of regretting splitting Gupta n Green(s)will threads.

They are so obviously the different side of the same Con.

The Australian underwriter who provided Greensill Capital’s lifeline

Greg Brereton was later dismissed from The Bond & Credit Co after being accused of breaching risk limits

https://www.ft.com/content/9722efce-7d32-4abd-99b8-46f6b47de6dc


The rise of Greensill Capital was fuelled by access to billions of dollars of insurance coverage provided by an easy-going underwriter, who lives in a nondescript house in a south Sydney suburb, tweets about cricket and hangs out at the local rugby league club.

Acquaintances of Greg Brereton say he is an unlikely figure to be at the centre of an international controversy. Yet court filings and interviews show the 58-year-old insurance executive had a crucial role until he was fired by his employer, The Bond & Credit Co, for allegedly breaching risk limits to Greensill, which collapsed last week.

...

After a stint at insurer QBE, Brereton was picked in late 2015 as head of trade credit for the agency that would become BCC. “While Greg believes in, and is a master practitioner in strong commercial acumen and due diligence, it’s his relationship-based philosophy and approach that helps him facilitate the all-important critical financial transactions,” BCC’s website said.

 

Hey Bruce, its Bruce. You get any more of those trade insurance? Yes? Great, chuck me $1billion, Ill drop off ofa slab later. You off to the cricket?

 

April 09, 2019 17:00 ET | Source: Tokio Marine HCC

https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2019/04/09/1801689/0/en/Tokio-Marine-Management-Australasia-Pty-Ltd-Acquires-the-Bond-and-Credit-Company.html

SYDNEY, Australia, April 10, 2019 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- Tokio Marine Management (Australasia) Pty Ltd (TMMA) today announced it has acquired the Bond and Credit Company (BCC).  BCC is a specialist product insurance underwriting agency with a product offering comprised of surety bonds and trade credit insurance.  The business produced gross written premium of A$36 million in the financial year ending June 30, 2018.  BCC employs 24 people and has offices in Sydney and Melbourne.

 

Greensill Downfall Began with Firing of Insurance Manager at Sydney Unit of Tokio Marine

https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2021/03/05/603916.htm

The debacle that led to the unraveling of Lex Greensill’s trade-finance empire began with the firing of a manager at a Sydney unit of insurance giant Tokio Marine Holdings Inc. last year.

After the July 8 dismissal by Bond & Credit Company [BCC] of Greg Brereton, the firm decided not to renew credit-insurance policies covering billions of dollars of Greensill’s loans, according to Australian court documents obtained by Bloomberg. The decision helped bring Greensill Capital to the brink of insolvency this week.

 

 

Link to post
Share on other sites
spygirl



Underlining the active nature of the work and reflecting the importance of insurance to Greensill, Cameron made a visit later that year to the Sydney offices of BCC to meet Brereton, according to two people familiar with the matter.

The visit was first reported by The Guardian. One person familiar with Cameron’s visit to the obscure BCC said that it bemused many in the Australian insurance industry. David Cameron visiting that office was just comic,” he said.

Cameron has not responded to repeated requests for comment on Greensill over the past two weeks. Reached by the Financial Times on Tuesday morning, Cameron replied: “Do you want to ring my office?” When told that his office was not answering any questions he abruptly hung up the phone.

  • Lol 1
Link to post
Share on other sites
Noallegiance
1 hour ago, spygirl said:



Underlining the active nature of the work and reflecting the importance of insurance to Greensill, Cameron made a visit later that year to the Sydney offices of BCC to meet Brereton, according to two people familiar with the matter.

The visit was first reported by The Guardian. One person familiar with Cameron’s visit to the obscure BCC said that it bemused many in the Australian insurance industry. David Cameron visiting that office was just comic,” he said.

Cameron has not responded to repeated requests for comment on Greensill over the past two weeks. Reached by the Financial Times on Tuesday morning, Cameron replied: “Do you want to ring my office?” When told that his office was not answering any questions he abruptly hung up the phone.

And not only do these fuckers get protected by their internal mates, the taxpayer pays for physical protection and transport, too.

It's set up for bent dealings with no comeback.

Link to post
Share on other sites
spygirl
24 minutes ago, Noallegiance said:

And not only do these fuckers get protected by their internal mates, the taxpayer pays for physical protection and transport, too.

It's set up for bent dealings with no comeback.

I dont think it is any more.

UK banks were only bailed out due to the idiot Brown.

We are 10 years down the line of new form of regulation where the big stinking turns stay with the people who laid it.

 

 

Link to post
Share on other sites
Loki
On 10/03/2021 at 13:45, eek said:

I'm still trying to find a purpose for blockchain that couldn't be done better by a trusted first or third party owning and managing a database

For AI I'm starting to see narrow benefits but mainly in photo processing and other niche industries where you are looking for particular items in a photo and have some control over the photos you are receiving otherwise you have issues like the ones highlighted in 'Typographic attack': pen and paper fool AI into thinking apple is an iPod | Artificial intelligence (AI) | The Guardian (yes it's the guardian it was the first link I found)

 

As far back as 2015, Google had to apologise for automatically tagging images of black people as “gorillas”. In 2018, it emerged the search engine had never actually solved the underlying issues with its AI that had led to that error: instead, it had simply manually intervened to prevent it ever tagging anything as a gorilla, no matter how accurate, or not, the tag was.

 

 

my fucking sides 

Wheeze.jpg.1ab69a33d1d6236c60f4614387d88f91.jpg

Link to post
Share on other sites
eek
1 minute ago, Loki said:

As far back as 2015, Google had to apologise for automatically tagging images of black people as “gorillas”. In 2018, it emerged the search engine had never actually solved the underlying issues with its AI that had led to that error: instead, it had simply manually intervened to prevent it ever tagging anything as a gorilla, no matter how accurate, or not, the tag was.

I suspect Google didn't want to kill the AI so it just kept it going while adding a secondary routine to correct the "mistake"

Decent AIs are hard to create so it's not surprising that Google kept it going - a different AI may have a completely different (and worse) set of foibles. 

  • Informative 1
Link to post
Share on other sites
spygirl

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-03-17/greensill-didn-t-just-finance-bluestone-s-supply-chain

of it went to financing “prospective receivables” from “prospective buyers.” That is, there would be some steel company that did not buy coal from Bluestone, and Bluestone and Greensill would agree that probably it should and some day it would, and they would figure that, well, if it did buy coal from Bluestone, it would probably buy like $15 million worth, and so Greensill would lend Bluestone that $15 million. And then Greensill would eventually collect the $15 million from the steel producer, if and when it did buy coal from Bluestone. This sounds a little like I’m kidding but I’m absolutely not:

 
 

The RPA Program contemplates the purchase by Greensill Capital from Bluestone of “prospective receivables” – receivables that have not yet been generated by Bluestone – from a list of “prospective buyers” – a list that included both existing customers of Bluestone and other entities that were not and might not ever become customers of Bluestone (the “Prospective Receivables”). This structure is expressly contemplated by the language of the RPA Program Documentation from its creation in 2018: the defined term “Receivables” includes so-called “prospective receivables” and the RPA identifies “prospective buyers” as “Account Debtors.” This list of Account Debtors was created by Defendants by providing Bluestone with a list of potential buyers and asking Plaintiffs to identify those buyers Plaintiffs believed could potentially be buyers of Bluestone’s met coal in the future. Defendants also determined in their discretion (i) the amount of each Prospective Receivables purchase and the credit amount of each Account Debtor, (ii) the “maturity date” of each Prospective Receivable (i.e., the nominal date that Bluestone would have to “repay,” or roll over the obligation to Greensill Capital), and (iii) additional terms relating to each Prospective Receivable purchase under the RPA. By structuring the RPA Program to be based predominantly on Prospective Receivables within the defined term “Receivables,” Greensill Capital – from the start – agreed to finance Bluestone based not on the existence and collectability of Bluestone’s then-existing receivables, but rather based on Bluestone’s long-term business prospects. 

They used the term “Account Debtors” to refer to steel companies that didn’t owe Bluestone or Greensill anything, were not Bluestone customers, and possibly had never heard of Bluestone or Greensill. It’s pretty bold! “Greensill Capital understood that most of the Account Debtors were not existing customers of Bluestone,” says the complaint.

 

In traditional receivables finance, Bluestone would sell $15 million of coal to Steel Company X, and would have a $15 million account receivable from Steel Company X, and would sell it to Greensill for like $14.9 million, and then Greensill would collect the $15 million from Steel Company X in a month or whatever.

In prospective receivables finance, though, you can’t do that: If Greensill advances Bluestone $14.9 million against $15 million of coal purchases by Steel Company Y, because Bluestone has idly contemplated maybe one day trying to set up a meeting with Steel Company Y and talking it into buying some coal, Greensill can’t go collect the $15 million from Steel Company Y. Steel Company Y hasn’t bought any coal and doesn’t owe anyone anything. As far as the Receivables Purchase Agreement is concerned, sure, yes, Steel Company Y is an “Account Debtor,” and Greensill has purchased $15 million of (prospective) receivables from Steel Company Y, but everyone is aware that this is just a fiction. 1  But the Receivables Purchase Agreement contemplates short-term financing of receivables. It’s not like Greensill loaned Bluestone the money for five years and said “hey if you do land a customer you can pay us back”; it’s more like Greensill loaned Bluestone the money as if Steel Company Y was already a customer and had already bought $15 million of coal.

Greensill basically gave Bluestone a payday loan for a job Bluestone hadn’t yet applied for. The result, of course, is that Bluestone had to keep rolling over the short-term loans:

From the inception of the RPA Program, as amounts purportedly came “due” under the RPA Program Documentation, Greensill Capital would “roll” amounts owed by Bluestone. The “rolling” of such amounts was part and parcel of the RPA Program from the beginning, offered by Defendants and affirmed throughout the parties’ relationship by consistent correspondence. By way of example, on January 4th, 2019, $15 million of Prospective Receivables were scheduled to “mature” or be rolled over. On that day, Greensill Capital was to “purchase” new Prospective Receivables in the amount of $15 million from Bluestone by wiring to Bluestone a discounted amount of $14,543,186 (with the “discount” corresponding to the interest to be paid from the date of the new purchase until the next roll date). Bluestone then wired to Greensill Capital the $14,543,186 just received from Greensill Capital plus the difference between such amount and the $15 million to be repaid ($456,814 in this instance) back to Greensill Capital. The net result of that exchange was Bluestone’s payment to Greensill Capital of only the $456,814 in interest.

They had to keep doing this. Every few months or whatever, 2  Greensill would come to Bluestone and say “hey did Steel Company Y pay you for that coal yet,” and Bluestone would say “nope, also we still haven’t sold them any coal, also we still haven’t ever met them and they still don’t know who we are,” and Greensill would lend Bluestone another $15 million so Bluestone could pay back the previous $15 million. (Eventually they agreed to do a “cashless roll,” where Bluestone just paid the interest instead of constantly exchanging the $15 million.)

 

Bluestone’s complaint here is essentially that these were supposed to be long-term loans, as you can tell from (1) the overall context of the relationship and (2) how much money Greensill collected from Bluestone. “Greensill Capital – from the start – agreed to finance Bluestone based not on the existence and collectability of Bluestone’s then-existing receivables, but rather based on Bluestone’s long-term business prospects,” says Bluestone, and: 

Taking the total value received by Greensill Capital ($108 million fees, warrants with a value of at least $100 million and approximately $89 million interest) into account, the return to Greensill Capital is consistent with a long-term financing commitment to a business like Bluestone, not a short-term liquidity facility.

I mean, yes, hundreds of millions of dollars of payments for $850 million of short-term loans seems quite high! But technically all the money Bluestone got from Greensill was in the form of short-term receivables financing. Now that Greensill is, uh, financially stretched, it has asked for its money back, and Bluestone doesn’t have it: It borrowed against its business prospects, and those prospects haven’t yet panned out. It wants Greensill to keep extending the loans until it finds customers to pay them off; it argues that that was, implicitly, the deal. For instance:

In September 2020, JCJ III met with Mr. Hartley-Urquhart at his home in Westhampton, New York to discuss the ongoing, long-term partnership between Greensill Capital and Bluestone. During that meeting, Mr. Hartley-Urquhart assured JCJ III that Greensill Capital would continue to fund Bluestone throughout the turbulent COVID-19 pandemic and work with Bluestone to improve production and sales. Mr. Hartley-Urquhart assured JCJ III that Greensill Capital would continue to “roll” and extend maturities until Bluestone was well-positioned to begin a gradual repayment. Consistent with their long-standing partnership, Mr. Hartley-Urquhart promised to not leave Plaintiffs “holding the bag” because he believed in the Bluestone business as an asset and believed in the strength of Bluestone’s management.

“JCJ III” is James C. Justice III, the chief executive officer of Bluestone and the son of West Virginia Governor Jim Justice (who is the majority owner of Bluestone). “Mr. Hartley-Urquhart” is Roland Hartley-Urquhart, who was then the vice chairman of Greensill and its main relationship person with Bluestone. The argument here is that the short-term loans that Greensill made to Bluestone were really long-term loans, because Hartley-Urquhart promised to extend them until Bluestone could pay.

I don’t find that argument particularly compelling — a lot of companies do a lot of short-term borrowing that they roll repeatedly; that doesn’t make it long-term financing! — but that’s not the point here. The point is that you can learn a lot about Greensill from Bluestone’s complaints about it.

 

Prospective receivables financing, for one thing. But also the Gupta relationship. One aspect of Greensill’s business that gets a lot of attention is its relationship with metals magnate Sanjeev Gupta and his collection of companies, called GFG Alliance. Gupta and GFG are in the steel business, Bluestone is in the business of selling coal to steel companies, they were both Greensill customers, so there was a natural business opportunity here. And in fact, says Bluestone:

In January 2020, Defendants [Greensill] introduced Plaintiffs [Bluestone] to GFG Alliance (“GFG”). GFG is a collection of global businesses and investments, owned by Sanjeev Gupta and his family. ... At the time, Bluestone was not familiar with GFG, but from Greensill Capital came to understand that GFG was also an important client of Greensill Capital’s, though Bluestone had no knowledge as to the extent or pervasive nature of the relationship between GFG and the Defendants.

After Defendants introduced Plaintiffs to GFG, Plaintiffs were emphatically encouraged by the Defendants into a customer relationship with GFG, delivering met coal to the Defendants’ recommended business partner. Bluestone sold their first delivery of met coal to GFG in June 2020 and for which GFG was granted an extended payment period to December 2020, for which GFG still was late in payment. Bluestone sold a second round of cargo in December 2020, to ship in January 2021—Bluestone ultimately withheld the shipment due to concerns regarding the credit risk of GFG. Following GFG’s failure to make payment to Bluestone when due in December 2020, Defendant Mr. Hartley-Urquhart at first vouched for GFG and urged Plaintiffs to continue to do business with GFG despite the late-payment, but later agreed that if he were in Bluestone’s shoes, he would not ship to GFG.

So one point there is that, according to Bluestone, Greensill’s vice chairman allegedly thought that GFG, one of Greensill’s biggest borrowers, was not a good credit risk: “If he were in Bluestone’s shoes, he would not ship to GFG.” Another point is that GFG missed its payment deadlines to Blueston, suggesting that in fact it was not a good credit risk. (And in fact it is trying to delay payments to Greensill now.)

But a third and stranger point is that … Greensill apparently wasn’t financing these payments? Like, Bluestone was shipping coal to GFG and then demanding payment, and GFG was delaying payment, and Bluestone was waiting on the money and worrying about GFG’s credit risk for subsequent shipments, and all of this was Bluestone’s problem, not Greensill’s? But, look, Greensill was in the business of (1) financing Bluestone’s receivables and (2) financing GFG’s payables. Greensill presumably had a deal with GFG saying “if you buy coal from a coal producer, we’ll give the coal producer money up front and you can pay us later, so the coal producer doesn’t have to worry about getting paid.” And Greensill definitely had a deal with Bluestone saying “if you sell coal to a steel producer, we’ll buy the receivable from you, so you can get money up front and not worry about the steel producer paying you.” In fact, under that deal, Greensill bought imaginary receivables from Bluestone based on imaginary customer relationships.

But when it came to Bluestone’s actual sales to GFG, Greensill — which financed both companies — was like “oh yeah, huh, weird that they haven’t paid you, maybe send them another bill?” I don’t get it! Greensill, a supply-chain finance company, introduced these companies to each other; you would think that the introduction would involve a promise to finance their supply chain. If it didn’t, that’s a little odd. 3

 

Or there are those Credit Suisse funds, to which Greensill sold a lot of its loans. Apparently Bluestone didn’t know that?

Around February 9, 2021, Plaintiffs learned for the first time of Greensill Capital’s purported obligations to funds managed by the Swiss bank group Credit Suisse relating to Bluestone’s supply chain financing or receivables. A few days after Bluestone paid Greensill Capital interest in connection with a “cashless roll,” Defendant Mr. Hartley-Urquhart urgently demanded Bluestone make an additional payment – this time to funds managed by Credit Suisse. Mr. Hartley-Urquhart explained to JCJ III that Greensill Capital itself had failed to make its own required payment to such Credit Suisse funds and attempted to pressure Bluestone into covering such unpaid Greensill Capital obligation. JCJ III refused, stating that he had no idea of Credit Suisse’s involvement or how any transaction between Bluestone and Greensill Capital implicated Credit Suisse. 

I don’t know what that has to do with the lawsuit, exactly, but I guess it would be weird to find out that what you thought was a long-term loan to finance growing your business was actually owned by a Credit Suisse money market fund.

And that seems to have been Greensill’s essential arbitrage. The classic business of banking is “borrow short to lend long”: A bank takes in demand deposits that can be redeemed at any time, and uses them to fund long-term loans that don’t get paid back for years. This is lucrative (the short-term deposits carry a much lower interest rate than the long-term loans) but obviously risky (if the depositors want their money back, the bank doesn’t have it), and over the centuries a huge regulatory apparatus has grown up to keep it safe. Various sorts of shadow banking have also grown up over the years, to try to get around that regulatory apparatus while running similar sorts of businesses. Financing long-term loans with short-term funding is a popular way to make money; it is also a well-known risky way to make money. 

One way around the problem is to tell the people providing the funding that they are financing short-term loans, while telling the people getting the loans that they are getting long-term loans. Here Greensill had a reputation — in the press, and apparently at Credit Suisse — for providing safe, short-term loans backed by receivables; the story on Greensill was always that it was an innovator in supply-chain finance, the boring business of lending companies money to cover the time between when they buy or sell a product and when the payment is due.

 

But when it talked to borrowers like Bluestone, Greensill allegedly assured them that it was investing in them for the long term, that it was giving them long-term loans based on their future business prospects, that they wouldn’t have to pay off the loans until those prospects materialized, that it would not leave them “holding the bag.” Sure sure sure the actual Receivables Purchase Agreement provided for short-term loans against receivables — you know, like supply-chain finance — but Greensill and Bluestone knew that wasn’t meant seriously. Or so Bluestone thought. Of course the Credit Suisse funds financing Greensill did think it was meant seriously. Who knows what Greensill thought. It seems to be taking it seriously now, though; at least, it wants its money back.

If you tell the people putting up money that they’re funding short-term loans, and you tell the people getting the money that they’re getting long-term loans, then everyone is happy for a while: As long as the money flows in and nothing goes wrong, it’s easy to roll the loans and everyone thinks they’re getting what they want. But if it does go wrong, nobody is happy. The people providing the funding are surprised and displeased that they can’t get their money back: “We thought this was short-term financing,” they say, and sue. The people getting the loans are surprised and displeased that they have to pay them back: “We thought this was a long-term loan,” they say, and also sue.

 

Terms of Service Manage Cookies Trademarks Privacy Policy ©2021 Bloomberg L.P. All Rights Reserved
 
 
 
 

Fucking insane.

  • Informative 2
Link to post
Share on other sites
planit

Completely insane and I don't see how this could have been hidden from the auditors. With Wireshark the deceit was a bit more criminal in intention. With Greensill this seems very Enron-esque, lending money against potential orders.

 

Quote

Controversial lender Greensill Capital is scrambling to find a new auditor as it gears up to float on the stock market. 

The specialist finance company, which was founded by Australian Lex Greensill and counts former prime minister David Cameron as an adviser, had previously enrolled the little-known Saffery Champness to vet its finances. 

But after growing too large and complex for Saffery's services, Greensill is searching for a larger auditor to do the job.

It has not been met with quite the enthusiasm it might have hoped for. Big Four accountants KPMG and Deloitte have turned down Greensill's invitations, the Financial Times reported, citing a conflict of interest. And BDO, which sits a rung down from the Big Four, has also rebuffed Greensill's approaches.

 

So they didn't manage to get a auditor very easily and they were probably advised that for an IPO their existing auditor was not going to be acceptable.

I couldn't find who took on the role in the end, probably would need to look on Companies House or something.

 

 

  • Agree 1
Link to post
Share on other sites
  • 2 weeks later...
wherebee

"David Cameron lobbied a second Conservative Treasury minister for access to government coronavirus support loans for the finance firm Greensill, The Times has learnt.

The former prime minister contacted Jesse Norman, financial secretary to the Treasury, at the same time as he was trying to get access to Rishi Sunak, the chancellor of the exchequer.

The emergence of Cameron’s contact with Norman raises further questions about the extent of the lobbying operation across government that he pursued in Greensill’s interests. At the time he was working as a senior adviser to the firm and was believed to have share options worth $60 million." - source, AUSTRALIAN 3rd Apr

 

Another slimy politician found with his trousers down.

  • Informative 1
Link to post
Share on other sites
Noallegiance
1 hour ago, wherebee said:

"David Cameron lobbied a second Conservative Treasury minister for access to government coronavirus support loans for the finance firm Greensill, The Times has learnt.

The former prime minister contacted Jesse Norman, financial secretary to the Treasury, at the same time as he was trying to get access to Rishi Sunak, the chancellor of the exchequer.

The emergence of Cameron’s contact with Norman raises further questions about the extent of the lobbying operation across government that he pursued in Greensill’s interests. At the time he was working as a senior adviser to the firm and was believed to have share options worth $60 million." - source, AUSTRALIAN 3rd Apr

 

Another slimy politician found with his trousers down.

Fascism is alive and well.

  • Informative 2
Link to post
Share on other sites
spygirl

Viz banking Top Tips:

Sack your risk officer before you lose billions not after.

Credit Suisse risk chief to leave after Archegos and Greensill losses

Investment banking boss is also out in shake-up

https://www.ft.com/content/c10d0b81-f2ef-48c3-8e9c-17419f4af21b



In a separate trading update, Credit Suisse said it stood to lose about $4.7bn from the implosion of Archegos, a family office run by former hedge fund manager Bill Hwang, slightly higher than earlier estimates. That would push the bank to a first-quarter loss of about SFr900m ($960m).

  • Lol 2
Link to post
Share on other sites
wherebee
17 hours ago, spygirl said:

Viz banking Top Tips:

Sack your risk officer before you lose billions not after.

Credit Suisse risk chief to leave after Archegos and Greensill losses

Investment banking boss is also out in shake-up

https://www.ft.com/content/c10d0b81-f2ef-48c3-8e9c-17419f4af21b



In a separate trading update, Credit Suisse said it stood to lose about $4.7bn from the implosion of Archegos, a family office run by former hedge fund manager Bill Hwang, slightly higher than earlier estimates. That would push the bank to a first-quarter loss of about SFr900m ($960m).

I've run into some risk officers in those banks in a past life.  The really good ones are hated by the business, as they say no to the edge of legality/risk stuff, and costs the business heads their bonuses.  If the bank bosses are more focused on targets than long term survival (and some bank bosses are good people who want to leave a good legacy, not all are cunts), the business people get the tough risk heads sacked, or not promoted.  You then end up with weak risk managers and....

 

hello Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, RBS, etc etc etc

  • Agree 2
Link to post
Share on other sites

Join the conversation

You can post now and register later. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.

Guest
Reply to this topic...

×   Pasted as rich text.   Paste as plain text instead

  Only 75 emoji are allowed.

×   Your link has been automatically embedded.   Display as a link instead

×   Your previous content has been restored.   Clear editor

×   You cannot paste images directly. Upload or insert images from URL.

  • Recently Browsing   0 members

    No registered users viewing this page.


×
×
  • Create New...